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Abstract
There exist several possibilities of fuzzification of a coalitional game. It
is quite usual to fuzzify, e. g., the concept of coalition, as it was done in [1].
Another possibility is to fuzzify the expected pay-offs, see [3, 4]. The latter
possibility is dealt even here. We suppose that the coalitional and individual
pay-offs are expected only vaguely and this uncertainty on the “input” of
the game rules is reflected also by an uncertainty of the derived “output”
concept like superadditivity, core, convexity, and others. This method of
fuzzification is quite clear in the case of games with transferable utility, see [6,
3]. The not transferable utility (NTU) games are mathematically rather more
complex structures. The pay-offs of coalitions are not isolated numbers but
closed subsets of n-dimensional real space. Then there potentially exist two
possible approaches to their fuzzification. Either, it is possible to substitute
these sets by fuzzy sets (see, e. g., [3, 4]). This approach is, may be, more
sophisticated but it leads to some serious difficulties regarding the domination
of vectors from fuzzy sets, the concept of superoptimum, and others. Or, it is
possible to fuzzify the whole class of (essentially deterministic) NTU games
and to represent the vagueness of particular properties or components of
NTU game by the vagueness of the choice of the realized game (see [5]). This
approach is, perhaps, less sensitive regarding some subtile variations in the
the fuzziness of some properties but it enables to transfer the study of fuzzy
NTU coalitional games into the analysis of classes of deterministic games.
These deterministic games are already well known, which fact significantly
simplifies the demanded analytical procedures.
This brief contribution aims to introduce formal specifications of both
approaches and to offer at least elementary comparison of their properties.
In all following sections we denote by I (non-empty and finite) set of
players, and each its element i ∈ I is a player. Any subset K ⊂ I is called
coalition. If x, y ∈ RI are real vectors, x = (xi)i∈I , y = (yi)i∈I , and K is a
coalition then we say that x dominates y via K, and write x domK y, iff
xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ K,




1 Deterministic NTU Coalitional Game Model
Let us introduce, at least very briefly, the concept of the game which is to be
fuzzified. The pair (I,V), where I is a set of players, is called non-transferable
utility coalitional game iff V is a mapping connecting any coalition K ⊂ I with a
set of real vectors V(K) ⊂ RI such that
V(K) is closed, (2)
if x ∈ V(K), y ∈ RI , x domK y, then y ∈ V(K), (3)
V(K) is non-empty, (4)
V(K) = RI ⇐⇒ K = ∅. (5)
It is very easy to verify the following statement (see, e. g., [2]).
Statement 1. If K ⊂ I, x /∈ V(K), y ∈ RI , y domK x, then y /∈ V(K).
The following concept appears useful for the definition of some significant prop-
erties of the NTU games.
If K ⊂ I then the set V∗(K) ⊂ RI such that
V∗(K) = {y ∈ RI : for any x ∈ V(K) the domination x domK y
is not fulfilled} = {y ∈ RI : ∀x ∈ V(K) either ∃ i ∈ K, yi > xi, or
∀ j ∈ K, yk = xj},
(6)
is called superoptimum of the coalition K (see [2]). The following statements are
immediate consequences of (6).
Statement 2. For any K ⊂ I, V(K) ∪ V∗(K) = RI .
Statement 3. For empty coalition, V∗(∅) = RI .
Statement 4. If for some K ⊂ I, x ∈ V∗(K) and y ∈ RI , y domK x, then
y ∈ V∗(K).
In the next sections we briefly describe some interesting fuzzifications of the
expected payments, and discuss the validity of some analogies of the previous state-
ments for them.
2 Fuzzification of Sets V(K)
If we aim to fuzzify the concept of NTU game then it is most natural to consider
some fuzzy subsets of RI instead of the crisp sets of admissible pay-offs V(K). Let
us consider for every coalition K ⊂ I a fuzzy subsetW(K) of RI with membership
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function µK : RI → [0, 1] fulfilling the following conditions. For every coalition
K ⊂ I:
the set {x ∈ RI : µK(x) = 1} is closed, (7)
if x domK y then µK(x) ≤ µK(y), (8)
if K 6= ∅ then ∃x ∈ RI : µK(x) = 0, and ∃y ∈ RI : µK(y) = 1, (9)
for empty coalition µ∅(x) = 1 for all x ∈ RI . (10)
Remark 1. If the membership function µK , K ⊂ R, achieves only two values
0, 1, then the sets W(K) fulfil the properties (2), (3), (4), (5) and the pair (I,W)
forms a classical NTU coalitional game.
It can be easily seen that if we for any K ⊂ I denote
V(K) = {x ∈ RI : µK(x) = 1}
then the pair (I,V) forms a deterministic NTU game in the sense of (2) – (5). The
fuzzy NTU game (I,W) can be considered for fuzzy extension of (I,V) or, vice
versa, (I,V) can be considered for deterministic reduction of (I,W). If we use in
the following sections the symbol V(K) in connection withW(K), it always means
the deterministic reduction in the above sense.
The previous definition of fuzzy NTU game (I,W) is natural. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to work with this model and to derive further concepts characterizing the
game and its solutions. As it can be easily seen, e. g., in [3], the fuzzy counterpart
of the superoptimum set V∗ (we will denote it byW∗) is one of the most important
notions used for the development of those advanced concepts of fuzzy NTU. The
properties of fuzzy sets W∗ are determined by the domination relation generating
it. There are at least two approaches to its construction. In the following subsection
we recall both of them and briefly discuss their advantages and disadvantages.
Both approaches follow from the intuitively natural expectation that fuzzy set
of possible pay-offs W(K) is to be connected with also vague (i. e. fuzzy) set of
indominable vectors W∗(K). The method of the construction of the deterministic
set V∗(K), formalized in (6) is based on the relation of domination via a coalition.
Even in the fuzzy case it would be so. It means that the two approaches to the
definition of fuzzyW∗(K) will be fully determined by corresponding approaches to
the fuzzification of the originally deterministic relation ·domK ·.
2.1 Natural Fuzzy Domination
The probably most natural way of transmission of the deterministic relation domK
into the environment of fuzzy NTU game (I,W) is based on the assumption that
the domination is as strong as much the dominating vector belongs to the setW(K)
(note, please, that the terminal purpose of the domination via K is to define the
fuzzy superoptimum set W∗(K)).
Hence, for every coalition K ⊂ I we define fuzzy ordering relation domFK on
the set RI with membership function νK(·, ·) where the value νK(x,y) defines the
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possibility with which x fuzzy dominates y via coalition K. The values νK(x,y)
are defined by
νK(x,y) = µK(x) if x domK y,
= 0 in the opposite case.
(11)
Remark 2. Condition (8) immediately implies that for K ⊂ I, z domK y, always
νK(z,x) ≤ νK(y,x).
It is worth mentioning that for W(K) such that µK(x) ∈ {0, 1} the relation
domFK does not turn into domK , as domK is much more universal, related to the
whole RI , meanwhile domFK is specialized for the construction of W∗(K) as shown
below.
In the fuzzy NTU game the set W∗(K), K ⊂ I, is to represent the set of all
vectors in RI which are not (fuzzy) dominated by any vector from the fuzzy set
W(K). It means that W∗(K), for any K ⊂ I, is a fuzzy subset of RI . We denote
its membership function µ∗K and define by
µ∗K(x) = 1− sup
(
νK(y,x) : y ∈ RI
)
. (12)
Remark 3. If for K ⊂ I µK achieves only values 0 and 1 then also µ∗K(x) = 0
for x /∈ W∗(K) and µ∗K(x) = 1 for x ∈ V∗(K).
Remark 4. Definition (12) immediately implies that the membership function
µ∗K is monotonous in the sense that
µ∗K(x) ≥ µ∗K(y) if x domK y.
Lemma 1. If there exists x ∈ RI such that µK(x) ∈ (0, 1) then for all y ∈ RI ,
µ∗K(y) = 1− µK(y).
Proof. The statement immediately follows from (8), (11) and (12).
Corollary. Under the assumption of Lemma 1
min (µK(x), µ∗K(x)) ≤ 1/2
for all x ∈ RI .
The interpretation of the previous result is rather unpleasant. It means that
many important objects of the game (see, e. g., the core [3]) can contain some
elements with a limited (and not very significant) possibility, only. This contra-
dicts with our intuitive idea about their importance, and devaluates the concept
of natural fuzzy domination domFK .
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2.2 Proper Fuzzy Domination
The definition of the fuzzy domination used in the previous subsection can be
modified in the following sense.
We introduce fuzzy relation over RI xDomFK y, and read x properly fuzzy
dominates y via K, with membership function νK(x,y) : RI ×RI → [0, 1], where
ν(x,y) = µK(x) if x domK y, µK(x) ≥ µK(y),
= 0 else.
(13)
Obviously, even the definition of proper fuzzy domination is, analogously to the
case presented in Subsection 2.1, exclusively aimed to the construction of some
kind of superoptimum set for K ⊂ I.
Remark 5. Due to (8) the previous definition is equivalent to
ν(x,y) = µK(x) if x domK y, µK(x) = µK(y),
= 0 else.
Then, evidently, fuzzy relation DomFK can be used, analogously to (12), to the
definition of a modified form of superoptimum for K ⊂ I. It is a fuzzy subset of
RI which we call proper fuzzy superoptimum (c. f. [3]), denote by W∗(K), whose
membership function is denoted by µ∗K and for any x ∈ RI
µ∗K(x) = 1− sup
(
νK(y,x) : y ∈ RI
)
. (14)
Lemma 2. If (I,V) is deterministic reduction of (I,W) then for any x ∈ V(K)∩
V∗(K) is µ∗K(x) = 1.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from the concept of deterministic re-
duction, and from (13) and (14).




min (µK(x), µ∗K(x)) : x ∈ RI
]
= 1
for the vectors x ∈ V(K) ∩ V∗(K).
Lemma 3. The values of νK(x,y) are different from 0 iff µK(x) = µK(y) > 0.
Then also νK(x, z) = ν(x,y) for all z ∈ RI such that
x domK z, z domK y.
Proof. Also this statement immediately follows from (8), (13) and (14).
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Lemma 4. The membership function µ∗K achieves the following values:
µ∗K(x) = 1 for x ∈ V(K) ∩ V∗(K),
> 0 if there exists y ∈ R with 0 < µK(y) < 1 such that
µK(y) = µK(x) and y /∈ V(K),
= 0 for all x ∈ V(K).
= 1 in other cases.
Proof. The statement summarizes the previous results with respect to (13) and (14).
The concept of proper fuzzy superoptimumW∗(K) avoids the main discrepancy
of the previous fuzzy superoptimumW∗(K) – its values are not limited by 1/2. On
the other hand, its membership function µ∗K need not be monotonous as we can see
in Lemma 4. This lack of monotonicity can be interpreted with serious problems
and in some cases it can lead to rather strange results.
3 Fuzzy Classes of NTU Coalitional Games
The method of fuzzification of NTU games, used in the previous section can be
characterized as fuzzification “from below” – the fuzzy sets W(K) compose the
game. It is also possible to use another method – let us call it fuzzification “from
above”. This method (c. f. [5]) is based on the idea that there exists a fuzzy
subclass of the class of all NTU games containing (with lower or higher degree of
membership) the set of games whose realization is vaguely expectable. The fuzzy
NTU game under the consideration can be constructed from this fuzzy class of
games. This approach will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.
Let us denote by V the class of all NTU games with the set of players I. By
W we denote a fuzzy subclass of V with membership function pi : V → [0, 1].
Then it is easy to define a fuzzy NTU game (I,W) with fuzzy setsW(K), where
the membership functions µK : RI → [0, 1] are given for every x ∈ RI
µK(x) = sup(pi(V) : x ∈ V(K)), K ⊂ I. (15)
Remark 6. It can be easily verified that the game (I,W) fulfills the properties
of fuzzy NTU coalitional game (7) – (10).
The classW is a fuzzy set whose elements are deterministic games for which the
superoptima V∗(K) are defined in the usual way (6). It means that, analogously
to the previous procedure, we may define fuzzy sets W∗(K) with membership
functions µ∗K by
µ∗K(x) = sup(pi(V) : x ∈ V∗(K)), x ∈ RI , K ⊂ I. (16)
In the previous paragraphs, we have constructed an individual fuzzy NTU game
(I,W) with fuzzy sets W(K) and W∗(K). As the method of construction of the
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sets W∗(K) significantly differs from the one used in Section 2, it can be obviously
expected that also its properties, namely the relations betweenW(K) andW∗(K),
are different from those presented in Section 2.
Lemma 5. Let V1, V2 be two games from the fuzzy seW with positive values of
membership functions pi(V1), pi(V2). Let K ⊂ I be a coalition such that V1(K) 6=
V2(K). Then there exists x ∈ RI such that
min (µK(x), µ∗K(x)) > 0.
Proof. Without lack of generality, we may suppose that there exists x ∈ RI such
that x ∈ V1(K) and x /∈ V2(K), i. e., x ∈ V∗2 (K). Hence,
min (µ∗K(x), µK(x)) ≥ max (pi(V1), pi(V2)) > 0.
Remark 7. The membership function µ∗K , K ⊂ I, is obviously monotonous in
the sense that
µ∗K(x) ≥ µ∗K(y) for x, y such that x domK y.
The above Lemma 5 can be extended in the following way.
Lemma 6. Let V1, V2 be two games from the fuzzy set W with positive values
of membership pi(V1), pi(V2). Let K ⊂ I and let V1(K) differs from V2(K). Then
sup
(
min(µ∗K(x), µK(x)) : x ∈ RI
) ≥ max (pi(V1), pi(V2)) .
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 5.
Another lower limit for the membership function of the intersection W(K) ∩
W∗(K) is presented in the next result.
Lemma 7. Let V be a member of the fuzzy set W with positive value of the
membership function pi(V), let K ⊂ I and let V(K) ∩ V∗(K) 6= ∅. Then
sup
(
min(µ∗K(x), µK(x)) : x ∈ RI
) ≥ pi(V).
Proof. The inequality immediately follows from (15) and (16).
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